A portfolio view of consumer credit by David K. Musto & Nicholas Souleles
 
WORKING PAPER NO. 05-25 
A PORTFOLIO VIEW OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
 
David K. Musto 
Finance Department, The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
and 
Nicholas Souleles 
Finance Department, The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
and 





   
 




  David K. Musto  Nicholas S. Souleles 
 Finance  Department  Finance Department 
  The Wharton School  The Wharton School 
  University of Pennsylvania  University of Pennsylvania 








This paper takes a portfolio view of consumer credit. Default models (credit-risk scores) 
estimate the probability of default of individual loans. But to compute risk-adjusted returns, 
lenders also need to know the covariances of the returns on their loans with aggregate returns. 
Covariances are independently relevant for lenders who care directly about the volatility of their 
portfolios, e.g., because of Value-at-Risk considerations or the structure of the securitization 
market. Cross-sectional differences in these covariances also provide insight into the nature of 
the shocks hitting different types of consumers. 
We use a unique panel dataset of credit bureau records to measure the ‘covariance risk’ of 
individual consumers, i.e., the covariance of their default risk with aggregate consumer default 
rates, and more generally to analyze the cross-sectional distribution of credit, including the 
effects of credit scores. We obtain two key sets of results. First, there is significant systematic 
heterogeneity in covariance risk across consumers with different characteristics. Consumers with 
high covariance risk tend to also have low credit scores (high default probabilities). Second, the 
amount of credit obtained by consumers significantly increases with their credit scores, and 
significantly decreases with their covariance risk (especially revolving credit), though the effect 
of covariance risk is smaller in magnitude. It appears that some lenders take covariance risk into 
account, at least in part, in determining the amount of credit they provide. 
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A basic principle of financial economics is that risk is properly viewed in a portfolio 
context. That is, the relevant measure of an investment’s risk (i.e., the measure relevant for 
discounting) is the risk that it adds to the portfolio of all investments.  The traditional subject of 
portfolio-risk research has been equities. By contrast consumer loans have received little 
academic analysis, especially portfolio-level analysis, even though they are typically held in large 
portfolios of thousands or even millions of loans, orders of magnitude more populated than most 
equity portfolios. The consumer credit market in the US is quite large, amounting to about $7 
trillion by 2000 (of which about $5.4 trillion is mortgage debt, $800 billion is other installment 
debt, and $700 billion is revolving debt) [Federal Reserve System (2001)]. Much of this debt is 
originated by large, national lenders. The debt is typically either held by the originator in large 
portfolios, or sold into large securitization pools [e.g., see Gorton and Souleles (2004)]. 
The goal of this paper is to provide a portfolio view of consumer credit.  Lenders usually 
gauge the risk of their consumer loans by credit-risk scores, which measure a consumer’s 
expected probability of default in isolation (a first moment). But the aggregate volatility of a 
portfolio of loans also depends on the cross-sectional covariances of the default risks of its 
component loans (second moments), which likely vary across borrowers. For example, the 
economies of some regions of the country are more cyclical than others. Suppose that default 
rates in Alaska have a relatively low covariance with default rates in other states; i.e., that 
Alaskans default relatively less when people in other states default relatively more, and vice 
versa. Then loans to Alaskans would entail less ‘covariance risk’ and so bring diversification 
benefits to a large portfolio of debt, contributing relatively little to the volatility of the portfolio.   
  This paper uses a unique panel dataset of credit bureau data to construct measures of 
covariance risk analogous to those from equity research, and more generally to study the cross-2   
sectional distribution of credit. We analyze the underlying demographic determinants of 
consumers’ covariance risk, and test whether consumers with lower covariance risk (among other 
characteristics) receive more credit, ceteris paribus (c.p.). We also measure the effect of the 
credit scores on the amount of credit, and contrast this with the effect of covariance risk.  
  There are several reasons for lenders to care about covariance risk. First, the insight of 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) applies to all assets, not just equities: In equilibrium, the 
market price of a consumer loan should depend on the risk that the loan adds to the market 
portfolio. If, analogously to the literature on equity investors, we take consumer lenders to be 
optimizing primarily over their own asset class, in this case consumer loans, then the risk-
adjusted expected return of a consumer loan would decline as its covariance with the return on 
the market portfolio of all consumer loans declines. 
  Second, there are several important institutional features of the consumer credit market 
that directly motivate lenders to regulate the volatility of their portfolios. Lenders typically assess 
the adequacy of their capital through ‘Value-at-Risk’ calculations, which estimate the probability 
that losses at the portfolio-level exceed some given threshold [e.g., see Saunders (1999)]. Indeed, 
the new Basel Accord requires lenders to set their capital levels as a function of such 
calculations. Also, many lenders rely on securitization to finance a large part of their loans. If 
total losses in a pool of securitized loans exceed a given threshold, the securitization typically 
either defaults or enters early amortization, a pre-payment risk for the lender. The portfolio risk 
of the pool determines how the securitization must be structured to avoid such outcomes and 
receive desired bond ratings.
1 Hence the insight of Markowitz (1959) applies to the construction 
                                                            
1 For instance, imagine that a lender knows, based on credit-risk scores, that the expected default rate on a pool of 
consumer receivables is 5%. This is consistent with two very different scenarios: 1) in a state of the world that occurs 
5% of the time (e.g. a recession), everyone in the pool defaults, and 2) everyone in the pool has an independently-3   
of portfolios of consumer loans: If a lender cares about the risk that a loan adds to his portfolio, 
he should prefer loans with low covariance risk, c.p.    
  Our methodology is analogous to that of the equity-pricing literature. Using individual 
consumers as our unit of observation, we track their credit scores to approximate the monthly 
returns experienced by their lenders. We then aggregate these individual time series into a time 
series of aggregate returns on consumer loans, and compute each consumer’s ‘default beta’ as the 
covariance of his individual returns with the aggregate returns. These default betas measure 
consumers’ covariance risk. 
   After computing the default betas, we investigate two key issues. First, is there systematic 
heterogeneity in the betas across consumers? For instance, how does covariance risk vary with 
income and age and with local economic conditions? The answers to such questions help 
characterize the shocks hitting different types of consumers, and so are of macroeconomic 
interest.
2 The answers are also of interest from the point of view of a lender. A lender can directly 
compute the beta of a current borrower assuming that a suitable time series of her credit usage is 
available in-house. But in the absence of such a time series, a potential new borrower’s beta must 
be estimated from her current characteristics. The second issue we investigate is whether 
empirically lenders put some weight on covariance risk in determining the amount of credit they 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
distributed 5% probability of defaulting, so in all states of the world 5% of the pool defaults.  In scenario 1 the 
individual receivables are perfectly correlated (maximal covariance), whereas in scenario 2 they are uncorrelated. 
The lender would presumably prefer scenario 2, c.p.  Since a constant 5% of the pool is defaulting in every given 
year, the aggregate cash flows from the pool are smooth relative to scenario 1.  This makes it easier to securitize the 
pool, since a claim on say the first 95% of the pool’s cash flows would pay 100 cents on the dollar no matter what.  
By contrast, a lender in scenario 1 has a problem.  No claim on the pool is risk-free without complete credit-
enhancement. Hence the receivables’ covariance structure determines how the pool can be carved into different 
securities, and the type and amount of credit-enhancement required. The securitization market shows informal 
appreciation of this covariance risk, in that a new issue’s prospectus will usually include some information regarding 
the diversification of the pool, such as its distribution across geographic and other characteristics (e.g., the 
age/seasoning of the debts).    4   
provide. It is well known that lenders take into account a consumer’s expected probability of 
default, in particular as measured by his credit score. The open question is whether consumers 
with greater covariance risk obtain less credit, even controlling for their scores and other factors. 
We compare the heterogeneity in covariance risk with the heterogeneity in credit risk as 
measured by the credit scores, and also compare the effect on credit of covariance risk with the 
effect of the credit scores. More generally, this is the first paper we know of to systematically 
study the determinants of the cross-sectional distribution of credit using the comprehensive credit 
bureau data. 
We obtain two key sets of results. First, there is significant systematic heterogeneity 
across consumers in covariance risk. Covariance risk is higher for younger and single consumers, 
lower-income consumers, those who rent rather than own, and those from states with higher rates 
of divorce and lower rates of health-insurance coverage. Consumers with high covariance risk 
also tend to have low credit scores (high default probabilities). Second, the amount of credit 
obtained by consumers significantly increases with their credit scores, c.p. Even controlling for 
the credit scores and other factors, the amount of credit significantly declines with consumers’ 
covariance risk, c.p.. We find declines in both non-revolving debt and especially revolving debt 
such as bankcard credit, in the number of loans and in the dollar value of credit limits extended. 
It appears that some lenders do take covariance risk into account, at least in part, in determining 
the amount of credit they provide. Nonetheless, the effect of covariance risk on credit is much 
smaller in magnitude than that of the credit scores. 
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections.  Section I discusses how we extend 
asset pricing theory to consumer credit.  Section II describes the dataset, and Section III our 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Souleles (2004) finds that ‘aggregate’ macroeconomic shocks have disparate effects across different types of 5   
econometric methodology. Section IV reports the results, and Section V concludes. 
 
I.  Applying Asset-Pricing Theory to Consumer Credit 
  As Markowitz (1959) observes, the risk of a security that affects the risk borne by its 
investors is the risk that it adds to a well-diversified portfolio.  Consequently, risk-averse 
investors should prefer securities whose payoffs covary relatively less with their current 
portfolios, c.p.  Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) show that, in equilibrium, all investors hold the 
value-weighted portfolio of all assets, and so they predict that investors prefer lower covariance 
with this portfolio. Specifically, they predict that expected returns are linear in betas. 
  The standard application of this covariance-pricing theory is to equities.  Much of the 
equity market is held through well-diversified portfolios, so it is plausible that there is greater 
investor demand for stocks with a low covariance vis-à-vis the value-weighted portfolio of all 
equities (i.e., for stocks with a low CAPM beta).  This theory is relatively easy to test because 
equity-return data are widely available.  Empirical research (e.g., Fama and MacBeth (1973)) 
generally supports covariance-pricing: Stocks with higher CAPM betas have historically paid 
higher subsequent returns on average. 
  Our analysis applies this covariance-pricing intuition to consumer credit, where data has 
been more scarce. Like stocks, consumer credit is also held through well-diversified portfolios.  
In fact, the major components of household debt, i.e., mortgages, car loans and bankcard debt, 
are held almost exclusively in portfolios with thousands or even millions of loans, so by this 
measure there is even greater diversification in the consumer credit market than in the stock 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
households. Pesaran et al. (2004) analyze heterogeneity in credit-risk diversification across firms.  6   
market. This suggests that consumer lenders might prefer lending to consumers who bring a 
covariance benefit to the aggregate portfolio of consumer loans. 
  The equity-market literature relates expected stock returns to covariances relative to the 
market portfolio of equities, which is only a subset of the market portfolio of all assets. Strictly 
speaking, this is consistent with the underlying theory under the additional simplifying 
assumption that equities are held by investors who hold only equities.  We can motivate our 
application to consumer credit analogously, by assuming that consumer loans are held by agents 
who hold only (or largely) consumer loans. As discussed above, institutional features of the 
consumer lending market provide independent motivation for our application. 
  The equity-market literature focuses on the pricing of securities, taking the quantities of 
securities to be fixed.  That is, the preference for lower covariance is associated with a higher 
price, not higher quantity.  However, if quantities are endogenous we should expect adjustment 
of both quantities and prices in equilibrium.  Both are surely endogenous even in the short run in 
the consumer credit market, so in this case covariance theory would predict that credit supply 
increases as covariance risk declines, c.p.  Indeed, the credit bureaus collect rich data on the 
quantities of credit, not the prices (nor interest rates), so this is the prediction on which we focus. 
  To apply covariance theory to consumer credit we need to calculate the return that a 
consumer’s lenders make on their loans to him during each month.  Unlike stocks, consumer debt 
is not publicly marked to market. Even the credit bureaus do not directly record these returns, but 
we can proxy for them by using the reported time-variation in consumers’ probability of 
repayment. The change in this probability approximates the price return on loans to the 
consumer.  7   
    Our dataset includes for each consumer monthly observations of their Fair Isaacs 
Company (FICO) credit-risk score, which is the industry-standard measure of consumers’ default 
risk. The credit scores aim to summarize the information in each consumer’s credit file regarding 
the probability of being seriously delinquent over the next two years, where ‘seriously 
delinquent’ means anything from 90+ days delinquent to bankrupt.
3 In practice lenders rely very 
heavily on the scores in setting their credit policy for each consumer, often using them as 
summary statistics for the consumer’s credit-worthiness and profitability [Moore (1996)]. Thus 
we let pi,t be the default probability implied by consumer i’s credit score as of date t.  
  We can use these default probabilities to mark to market a stylized consumer credit.  
Consider a consumer who has borrowed one dollar and promised to repay it at a future date, so 
that the market value of the loan on date t is approximated by 1-pi,t, the current probability of 
repayment. Then the return on the loan at date t is approximated by pi,t-1 - pi,t, the change in the 
probability of repayment. Because it is more natural to analyze the change in p rather than -1 
times the change in p, we analyze pi,t - pi,t-1. That is, we refer to changes in the probability of 
default -- and ‘default betas’ -- as opposed to changes in the probability of repayment. Because 
we will look at covariances between time series that have both been multiplied by -1, this 
normalization is of no consequence.
4      
 
II.  Data Description 
This paper uses a unique, proprietary panel dataset of credit files from one of the major 
U.S. credit bureaus, Experian. The dataset tracks approximately 100 thousand randomly sampled 
                                                            
3 Gross and Souleles (2002) verify that the credit scores are very significant predictors of consumer default. Musto 
(2004) analyzes additional properties of the scores. 8   
consumers monthly from 1997:03 to 2000:03, a total of 37 months. (See Musto (2004) for 
additional information about the dataset.)
5,6  
Credit bureau files contain comprehensive summaries of the credit relationships (‘trades’) 
held by each consumer. For each credit trade, there are various measures of the amount of debt 
held and the repayment performance. The underlying data are obtained primarily from the 
creditors, mostly financial institutions and retail lenders. Our dataset contains the partially 
aggregated credit reports for each consumer that are available to and used by lenders to evaluate 
whether to lend to the consumer. These reports aggregate the consumer’s individual trades into 
categories reflecting different types of credit, such as mortgages, auto loans, credit cards, etc. For 
each consumer-month, the dataset includes dozens of variables summarizing credit usage and 
delinquency, as well as credit limits where applicable. For example, for bankcards the available 
variables include “Total number of open bankcard trades,” “Total number of bankcard trades 
presently 90 or more days delinquent or derogatory,” and “Total (sum) of credit limit on all open 
bankcard trades.”
7 There are analogous variables for the other credit categories. 
We merge this data with another, proprietary research dataset from Experian that contains 
salient individual demographic characteristics such as marital status, gender, number of children, 
housing status (rent vs. own), date of birth and income.  This demographic information covers 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 More generally, we need only that the p we use be linear in default probability. As noted below, this means that the 
credit scores need to be transformed, because they are calibrated as a non-linear function of default probability. 
5 The sample is a geographically stratified random sample. The dataset includes an artificially generated ID variable 
that allows us to cross-link the various data available for a given individual without identifying the individual.  
6 The unit of observation in the data is an individual, not a household. Thus it is not possible to study issues like risk-
sharing within households. If both members of a couple are jointly responsible for a loan, e.g. a mortgage, then the 
loan will appear in both of their credit files. It is not possible to directly adjust for such joint accounts in the data, 
though the analysis of credit allocations below will control for the sample members’ demographic characteristics, 
including marital status and gender.  
7 Bankcards include general purpose credit cards like Visa, Mastercard, Discover, and Optima cards, as opposed to 
cards from retailers. Since the unit of observation is an individual, not a trade, consumers with multiple bankcards or 
multiple other trades appear in the sample just once.  9   
about 80% of the credit-file sample, though some variables are populated more than others.
8 We 
further augment this individual-level data with measures of local economic conditions in the 
region in which each consumer lives (based on state and zip codes), such as the state 
unemployment and divorce rates. These individual and regional variables allow us to investigate 
the underlying demographic determinants of covariance risk.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis below. In 
2000 the average consumer in our sample has a total of 6.6 currently open credit relationships 
(AllTrades00). Of these trades, 1.7 are non-revolving trades, such as mortgage, auto, and other 
installment loans (Nonrevolving00), and 4.9, the majority, are revolving trades such as credit 
cards (Revolving00). The average sum of credit limits across all open bankcards (CardLimits00) 
is about $18 thousand. The large standard deviations around these averages imply substantial 
heterogeneity in all these measures of credit. Along the extensive margin, 92% of the sample 
have at least one open credit trade (AllTrades00 > 0), with 73% having non-revolving trades and 
85% having revolving trades.  
  The resulting dataset is ideally suited for the purposes of this paper. Most notably it 
includes the credit-risk scores, which summarize lenders’ own expectations regarding 
consumers’ probabilities of default – the first moments p. We do not need to estimate these 
probabilities ourselves; we use the actual (calibrated) probabilities that the lenders themselves 
use. With a long time series of credit scores for each consumer, we can compute for each 
consumer the covariance – a second moment – of the time series of changes in his probability of 
default with the corresponding aggregate time series. Also, we have rich measures of the credit 
                                                            
8 This demographic information is not part of consumers’ credit bureau files. It was obtained from a variety of public 
and propriety sources, including census and marketing databases. For example, homeownership is determined from 10   
obtained by each consumer, so we can test whether credit supply varies with the consumer’s 
covariance risk, even controlling for his credit score and other characteristics. 
The credit score measures the likelihood of default over the next 24 months. While it is 
scaled from 300-850 (with larger values representing smaller likelihoods of default), it was 
originally calibrated from actual default rates. We invert this calibration to recover the underlying 
default probability units. For each consumer i and month t we produce pi,t, the expected 
probability of default.
 9  Then ri,t ≡ pi,t - pi,t-1 is the monthly change in the probability of default. 
As discussed above, with its sign reversed, ri,t proxies for the monthly return to lending to the 
consumer. 
Table 1 illustrates the importance of the credit scores in the allocation of credit. The third 
and fourth columns split the sample at the average score in 1999:03. Consumers with the higher 
scores have much more credit in the subsequent year, along both the extensive and intensive 
margins. For instance, 99% of these consumers have at least one open credit trade, compared to 
85% of the low-score consumers. The high-score consumers hold almost twice as many total 
trades, and over twice as many revolving trades. Their credit limits are about six times larger, 
$32 thousand versus $5.5 thousand.  
The default betas that we estimate below capture the systematic component of each 
consumer’s default risk. The remaining component is idiosyncratic. In principle a lender can 
diversify away this idiosyncratic risk by holding a large, diversified portfolio of loans. To gauge 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tax assessor and deed information, supplemented by a model predicting homeownership as a function of consumer 
characteristics. 
9 We divided the initial credit scores in 1997:03 into 20 (5 percentile) bins, and then within each bin measured the 
default rate over the next 24 months. As indicated by the Experian User Guide, the resulting relation is exponential. 
Accordingly we regressed the log of the average default rate across bins on a cubic polynomial in the average score, 
and use the resulting predicted probabilities of default for p. Consistent with the definition of the scores, we include 
in default both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy delinquency (90+ days late), conditional on not already starting in 11   
the potential scope for diversification of consumer loans, we first contrast the results of holding 
diversified and undiversified portfolios of various sizes. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of 
‘long-run returns’ across various portfolios, using the 3-year change in the probability of default, 
ri,long = pi,2000:03 - pi,1997:03. The horizontal axis records the number of consumers in each portfolio, 
the vertical axis measures the standard deviation of returns cross-sectionally across 100 
portfolios of each size. The figure is analogous to well-known figures showing the effects of 
diversification across stocks, sometimes constraining stock portfolios to one country or industry 
[e.g., Solnik (1974)]. 
The (lower) line labeled ‘random’ allocates consumers randomly across the 100 
portfolios. The resulting standard deviation drops quickly with portfolio size, from about 1.6% 
for a portfolio with only one consumer, to only .06% for a portfolio with six hundred consumers, 
with most of the decline coming from the first few hundred consumers. This decline suggests a 
large scope for diversification. Lenders do not, however, hold exactly equally weighted, random 
portfolios of consumer loans. For comparison, the line labeled ‘geo-undiversified’ reflects the 
geographically worst diversified portfolio, successively adding to each portfolio the consumer 
with the next closest zip code in the sample.
10 The standard deviation still drops quickly with 
portfolio size. Nonetheless for a portfolio of size 600 it drops to only about .10%, about two-
thirds larger than for the random portfolio. This difference suggests that the costs of holding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
default in 1997:03. As a robustness check we also estimated a logit model of default over the next two years as a 
function of a cubic polynomial in the initial score. This produced very similar results to those below. 
10 To construct the random portfolios, within each portfolio we randomly ranked each consumer 1-600, then formed 
portfolios of size 1-600 based on these ranks. We compute the mean return r*,long within each portfolio, and then 
compute the cross-sectional standard deviation of r*,long across the 100 portfolios. We repeat this exercise 10 times 
and graph the average results. To start each of the 100 geographically undiversified portfolios, we randomly sampled 
consumers subject to the constraint that the consumer have 600 unselected consumers around him (in zip-code 
space). To each of these starting portfolios we add the consumer with the closest zip code, among the remaining 
consumers, to the first portfolio-member’s zip code. 12   
undiversified portfolios, even large portfolios, can be significant. More generally, these results 
suggest that there might be substantial systematic heterogeneity in default risk across consumers 
of different characteristics, including here geographic location.  It remains to be seen whether 
lenders take this heterogeneity into account in extending credit. 
 
III.  Econometric Methodology  
We begin by estimating consumers’ default betas, by computing the covariance of the 
time series of each consumer’s monthly changes in default probability with the corresponding 
time series for the monthly ‘aggregate’ changes in default probability. Specifically, for each 
consumer i, we run the following time-series regression:  
  ri,t  =  αi  + βi r*t  + εi,t ,  (1)   
where r*t is the cross-sectional average of the change in default probabilities ri,t within the entire 
sample in month t. The resulting coefficient βi is consumer i’s ‘default beta’. A larger default 
beta represents greater covariance risk. 
  Below we study how these betas affect credit supply, including the change in credit over 
the final year of the sample period, 1999:03-2000:03. Accordingly, to avoid endogeneity, we 
compute the betas in equation (eq.) (1) using data from the preceding part of the original sample 
period, 1997:04 through 1999:03. Reducing the beta-estimation period increases the estimation 
error in our betas, making it harder to find an effect of the betas on credit.
11 Even so, almost a 
fifth of the resulting betas are statistically significantly different, at the 5% level, from 1.0 (the 
                                                            
11 To improve precision we limited the sample to consumers where the default probabilities p are available for all 24 
months after the first month of the sample, i.e. 1997:04-1999:03. This retains about 94% of consumers. Hence in eq. 
(1) rit is available for every month t=1997:05-1999:03 for all consumers. The results below are similar, though 
sometimes less significant, on including the consumers with fewer available observations of p.  13   
average beta). This suggests that the informational content of the estimated betas is relatively 
high.   
  We also considered a number of robustness checks in computing the default betas. For 
instance, we computed analogous betas using the change in credit scores directly (Scoret - Scoret-
1), as opposed to the change in the calibrated probabilities of default. We also used non-
overlapping, two-month changes in the default probabilities (pt - pt-2). The conclusions below are 
robust to these alternatives, though sometimes somewhat weaker in magnitude using the two-
month changes because of the smaller effective sample.
12 
  After computing the default betas, we investigate two issues. First, is there systematic 
heterogeneity in the betas? Second, do lenders take covariance risk into account in determining 
the amount of credit they provide? We compare the results with analogous results using the credit 
scores. 
  To investigate the first issue, heterogeneity in the default betas, we estimate the following 
equation, cross-sectionally across consumers i: 
  βi  =  γ0  + γ1 Xi  + εi ,     (2) 
where vector Xi includes the key demographic characteristics of consumer i available in the 
dataset. These variables are flexibly specified as a series of indicator variables. To maintain 
sample size, instead of dropping observations with missing demographic characteristics, we 
include additional indicator variables for the missing values with the corresponding original 
indicator variables then set to zero.
13,14  
                                                            
12 We do not include stock returns as an independent variable in eq. (1), partly due to the differences in the way that 
they and our changes in default probabilities are computed. The correlation between r*t and monthly returns on the 
S&P 500 stock index is negative (recall that r*t is -1 times the estimated return) but statistically insignificant. 
13 The indicator ‘DemographicsMis’ in the tables refers to a subset of the auxiliary demographic dataset, constituting 
about 20% of total sample consumers (Table 1), for whom the individual-level demographic variables are mostly all 14   
  We sometimes augment these individual-level demographic variables with measures of 
local economic conditions in the region in which each consumer lives. Gross and Souleles (2002) 
show that such economic variables can improve predictions of consumer default, even after 
controlling for the credit scores. Unemployment measures the state-level unemployment rate. 
This data is available monthly. Since the betas are computed using data starting in 1997:04, we 
take the unemployment rate from 1997:03. This timing allows us to assess the effect of 
unemployment on subsequent default behavior. It is also consistent with the point of view of a 
lender who wishes to estimate betas for potential new customers using already available 
information.  Xi  also includes the fraction of people in the state without health insurance 
(Noinsurance) and the divorce rate in the state (Divorce). These variables are available only 
annually, and so we take them from 1997. In specifications including the regional variables, the 
standard errors are adjusted to allow for within-state correlation.
15  
  Other specifications replace the regional variables with state dummy variables. These 
dummy variables control for all state-level geographic effects on covariance risk, including state 
regulations that affect the costs of default (e.g., state bankruptcy laws), the composition of jobs 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unavailable. The other indicators with the suffix ‘Mis’ identify additional missing demographic values for the 
remaining consumers for whom some demographic characteristics are usually available. (The variable for number of 
kids is taken from birth records and other sources that help identify the number of children when children are 
present, but do not directly identify households with no children. Hence ‘KidsMis’ reflects both missing/uncertain 
values and zero children.) Since these individual demographic characteristics are still sometimes not populated, for 
different subsets of the sample, limiting the sample to consumers with all of their demographic characteristics 
populated would eliminate about 90% of the sample. Dropping only the smaller set of consumers with 
DemographicsMis=1 eliminates 20% of the sample, but nonetheless the results are similar to those below. (The main 
exception is that in Table 4 beta becomes less significant for non-revolving trades.)  
14 Eq. (2) does not control for consumers’ credit scores because they are likely to be simultaneously determined with 
the betas and hence endogenous. Eqs. (3) and (4) by contrast can use both the scores and the betas as independent 
variables. 
15 The results below are similar using the Department of Labor’s county-level unemployment rate (substituting the 
state-level rate when the county-level rate is unavailable). The divorce variable (which comes from the Department 
of Health and Human Services) is missing for a few states. To avoid dropping all observations in these states, we 
instead introduce a dummy variable for missing divorce data. The divorce rate is computed in per capita terms, since 
the only readily available normalizing variable is state population. 15   
across occupations and industries in the state, the correlation of the state business cycle with the 
national business cycle, etc. The state dummies also control for all differences in average 
household characteristics across states. For comparison, we re-estimate eq. (2) with the credit 
score in 1999:03 as the dependent variable.  
  The second issue we examine is whether lenders take some account of covariance risk in 
their lending decisions, at least implicitly. To test whether default betas influence the amount of 
credit obtained by consumers, and to analyze the distribution of credit more generally, we 
estimate the following equation, again cross-sectionally across consumers i: 
  Crediti,00  =  γ0  + γ1 Scorei,99  + γ2 βi  + γ3 Xi  + εi ,     (3) 
where Crediti represents various measures of the credit granted to consumer i, and Scorei is i's 
credit-risk score. The score summarizes the expected probability of default. Although lenders are 
known to rely heavily on the scores in allocating credit, since the scores are not available in 
traditional household datasets used in previous studies, their importance in credit supply has not 
been previously systematically studied. Since larger scores imply a smaller probability of default, 
we expect to find larger scores associated with more credit, c.p. We will quantify how much 
credit increases with the score.
16  
  By contrast, less is known about the extent to which lenders also take covariance risk into 
account. They might put some weight on diversifying their loans across certain characteristics, 
but this weighting might be done informally, not systematically. If lenders exhibit some 
                                                            
16 We use in eq. (3) the scores and not the underlying probabilities of default because lenders themselves use the 
scores, not the probabilities directly. The conclusions below are robust to using cubic polynomials in the scores. 
Hence the default betas are not simply picking up nonlinearities in the effect of the scores. Eq. (3) introduces the 
scores linearly only for ease of exposition. Also, we report the results estimating eq. (3) by OLS, but the estimated 
effects are quantitatively similar using tobit models. Since the vast majority of the sample has credit relationships, 
the reported results emphasize the intensive margin using OLS. Some recent papers have analyzed the effects of 
credit scores and credit quality on mortgage debt; see e.g. Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000), Barakova et. al. 
(2003), and Chomsisengphet and Elul (2004). 16   
preference for consumers with low covariance risk, even after controlling for consumers’ credit 
scores, the coefficient γ2 on the default beta will be negative. On the other hand, if lenders care 
only about the first moment of default, then γ2 will be insignificantly different from zero.
17,18   
  Of course, the probabilities of default, and so the credit scores, are themselves influenced 
by the amount of debt consumers hold. Covariance risk might also be affected by debt. To 
minimize endogeneity, in eq. (3) the score and the beta are lagged one year relative to the 
dependent variable Credit. Specifically, we measure Credit as of 2000:03 and the score as of 
1999:03, while the beta was computed using information from 1997:04 to 1999:03. This timing 
is also consistent with the analysis below of the change in credit over the final year of the sample 
period, 1999:03-2000:03, which further helps avoid endogeneity. 
  Eq. (3) will sometimes also control for Xi, the same individual-level demographic 
characteristics and state dummy variables described above. Including these variables does not 
imply that lenders directly condition on them in setting credit supply; the variables might simply 
be correlated with other factors on which lenders condition, including e.g. application data that is 
not available in the credit bureau files.
19 Nonetheless we sometimes include Xi in order to test 
whether any estimated effect of the default beta on credit might reflect the correlation of beta 
with demographic and regional characteristics. This provides a more conservative estimate of the 
effect of beta. If beta is significant even controlling for Xi, then beta contains additional 
                                                            
17 To minimize the role of outliers when the estimated betas are used as independent variables, in eqs. (3) and (4) 
below we drop betas with absolute values above 10. Such outliers represent only about 1-2% of the sample. In eq. 
(2), which has beta as the dependent variable, we do not drop the outliers in the reported results, but we have verified 
that the conclusions are not driven by outliers.  
18 Eqs. (3) and (4) do not take into account the fact that the default betas were estimated in a previous stage, and so 
their reported standard error must be interpreted with some caution. Nonetheless, as noted above, measurement error 
in the betas could substantially attenuate their point estimate, making it on balance harder to find that they have a 
significant effect on credit.  17   
information relevant for credit allocations above and beyond the heterogeneity studied in eq. (2). 
 On the other hand, if Xi is significant or reduces the significance of beta, it remains possible that 
the demographic variables in Xi are still partly picking up aspects of covariance risk that are not 
fully captured by the imperfectly measured beta. Xi also helps control for differences across 
households in the demand for credit. 
  The credit bureaus characterize credit relationships by type, one of the key distinctions 
being revolving versus non-revolving credit. Non-revolving credit consists mostly of mortgages, 
auto loans, and other installment loans. Such loans typically involve borrowing a fixed amount 
against a given purchase and repaying this amount with interest over time according to a pre-
arranged schedule. By contrast, revolving loans are typically open-ended and uncollateralized. 
The most important example is bankcard credit cards, which give the borrower a flexible line of 
credit. In addition to having different contractual features, revolving and non-revolving loans can 
differ in the type of information available to lenders, in addition to credit bureau information,  
that might help them assess the covariance risk of different consumers. For both types of loans 
lenders can obtain additional information at the time of application, but the application 
information is typically richer for non-revolving loans. On the other hand, credit card issuers 
continue to manage their credit limits over time. In doing so they can take advantage of the rich 
information that they internally accumulate over time concerning the past behavior of their 
customers.  
  Accordingly, to allow for potential differences in the ability and practice of different 
lenders to assess and put weight on consumers’ covariance risk, in eq. (3) we use different 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19 Indeed, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act lenders cannot directly condition on certain demographic 
characteristics, including gender, age and marital status, as well as race, religion and national origin. 
 18   
measures of Credit00. We distinguish the number of non-revolving and revolving trades. Since 
the latter largely reflects bankcards, we also consider the dollar-magnitude of revolving credit by 
studying total bankcard credit limits for each consumer. Compared to non-revolving debt, with 
revolving debt one can more readily distinguish credit supply from credit demand by focusing on 
credit limits as opposed to credit balances.
20 
Even though the credit score and default beta used in eq. (3) are lagged, and so contain 
only information available by 1999:03, some of the credit relationships recorded in the dependent 
variable might have been initiated before 1999:03. To minimize any resulting endogeneity, we 
also estimate the relation between credit and beta in differences: 
        d(Credit)i,00 = γ0 + γ1 Crediti,99 + γ2 d(Score)i,99 + γ3 βi  + γ4 βi* d(Score)i,99 + γ5 Xi  + εi , (4) 
where d(Credit)00 is the change in credit between 2000:03 and 1999:03. Working in differences 
also controls for all individual fixed effects in the level of credit. Further, to allow the magnitude 
of the change in credit to vary with the initial amount of credit, Credit99  is the starting amount of 
credit in 1999:03. To allow a discontinuity for people starting without any credit, we also include 
an indicator (Credit99_zero) that equals one if the amount of credit in 1999:03 is zero.   
What could prompt lenders to supply more credit to a given consumer? One of the most 
important factors would be an increase in her credit score. Accordingly the independent variables 
include the change in the score. To avoid endogeneity the change is lagged, and computed over 
the prior two-year period over which the beta was also computed: d(Score)i,99 = Score99:03 – 
Score97:03.  This timing treats the beta and the score symmetrically. It is also consistent with the 
point of view of a lender who, in considering in 1999 whether to extend credit to consumer i, 
considers variables potentially available at the time.  
                                                            
20 E.g., see Gross and Souleles (2002a). The results for bankcard limits below are similar on also controlling for 19   
For a given change in the credit score, the resulting change in credit might vary with the 
consumer’s default beta. Hence eq. (4) also includes the interaction of beta with the change in 
score, βi*d(Score)i,99, as well as the beta directly. If consumers with larger default betas receive 
smaller increases in credit for the same increase in their scores, then the coefficient γ4 on the 
interaction term would be negative. Such a result would be especially suggestive that lenders 
give some consideration to covariance risk in allocating credit, since eq. (4) controls for both beta 
and the change in the score separately (and sometimes also for the demographic characteristics 
and state dummies in Xi).
21 
 
IV.  Results  
We begin by analyzing the estimated default betas. Is there systematic heterogeneity in 
the betas across consumers, which lenders can potentially take into account in supplying credit? 
We next proceed to analyze the actual supply of credit. Do consumers with greater covariance 
risk obtain less credit, even controlling for their expected probability of default (as measured by 
the credit scores) and other factors? 
Table 2 presents tests for heterogeneity in the estimated default betas, following eq. (2). 
As a starting point, column (1) considers only individual-level demographic characteristics. The 
omitted demographic categories are low income (below $25 thousand), young (below age 30), 
unmarried, female, one child, one adult, renter, and not a business owner. The indicator variables 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
bankcard balances in eq. (3), and for the change in balances in eq. (4), despite the potential endogeneity of balances. 
21 One could additionally consider in eq. (4) the effect of a change in beta, but it cannot be readily estimated in the 
data. E.g., betas estimated over two-year windows will be slow to adjust over time, and 1999:03-2000:03 would be a 
short period for estimating the updated value of beta. Similarly in eq. (3), one could consider the effect on credit of 
the ‘contemporaneous’ beta, instrumenting for it with a lagged beta, but it is difficult to estimate a contemporaneous 
beta corresponding to Credit00 at the point in time 2000:03. 20   
for missing or unknown demographic values are labeled with the suffix ‘Mis’.
22 The 
demographic variables are jointly statistically significant, and many are individually significant. 
Starting at the top of the column, the default betas significantly decline with income. The beta of 
a high-income consumer (above $50 thousand) is about 0.24 smaller than that of a low-income 
consumer, c.p. Relative to the average beta of 1.0, this effect is also economically significant. 
The betas also decline monotonically with age, with the effect large in magnitude. Consumers 
aged 60 and above have average betas about .42-.56 smaller than those of young consumers. 
Hence high-income and older consumers exhibit less covariance risk – they are less likely to 
default when the aggregate default rate is high, and vice versa, relative to other consumers. The 
betas are also smaller for consumers who are married, female, have children, or own their homes. 
By contrast, business ownership is insignificant, but that might be driven by the small incidence 
of business ownership reported in the data. 
Column (2) instead considers regional economic conditions in the state in which the 
consumer lives. These conditions are measured as of 1997, in order to see their effect on the 
default betas, which were estimated over 1997-1999. The regional variables are jointly 
significant. The betas significantly increase with the fraction of people in the state lacking health 
insurance and with the divorce rate in the state. The coefficient on the state unemployment rate is 
also positive, though insignificant. Hence, in addition to increasing the probability of default, as 
previously studied, adverse regional conditions also tend to increase covariance risk. Column (3) 
includes both the individual and regional characteristics. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those in the previous columns, though the divorce rate is less significant in conjunction with the 
individual controls. 
                                                            
22 Recall that for missing values the corresponding original indicator variables are set to zero, so the coefficients on 21   
Column (4) replaces the regional controls with state dummy variables, which control for 
all state-level geographic effects on covariance risk. The (unconditional) sample average default 
betas vary substantially across states, ranging from about .7 in Vermont and Alaska to about 1.3 
in Delaware. Generally the betas tend to be larger in the South and smaller in New England.
23 In 
column (4) of Table 2 the state dummies (not shown) are jointly statistically significant. That is, 
even controlling for the available individual-level characteristics, the betas still vary significantly 
across states. Nevertheless the individual characteristics remain significant.  
For comparison, column (5) repeats the specification of column (3) using the credit score 
in 1999 as the dependent variable instead of the default beta. It is important to recognize that the 
score does not directly condition on the individual and regional demographic control variables 
used here. (Indeed, the controls come from different datasets.) Instead, the results simply reflect 
reduced-form correlations between these demographic characteristics and the credit bureau 
information predictive of default that is used in constructing the scores (mostly debt holdings and 
repayment histories).
24 Because they tend to be less likely to default, high-income, older, married, 
and home-owning consumers have significantly larger scores. Scores also tend to be greater in 
states with lower rates of unemployment, divorce, and lack of health insurance, though only the 
latter is statistically significant.
25  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the ‘Mis’ indicators should be interpreted relative to the omitted categories.   
23 In light of the smaller bin sizes, these unconditional results by state drop outliers in the betas, as in Tables 3 and 4. 
24 According to Fair Isaacs, about 35% of the score reflects measures of payment history, 30% amounts owed, 15% 
length of credit history, 10% new credits applied for, and 10% other factors such as the mix of credit types. The 
scores are not functions of demographic characteristics like gender and marital status disallowed under the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act [Fair Isaacs (2005)]. 
25 The significance of regional shocks might vary with the sample period. Our sample period ends before the 2001 
recession, so there might not be enough variation in unemployment in the sample to attain significance in Table 2. 
By contrast, Gross and Souleles (2002) found that cross-state differences in unemployment rates were correlated 
with consumer bankruptcy probabilities over their 1995-97 sample period.  22   
Notably, the effects of the demographic characteristics on the scores in column (5) 
usually have the opposite sign as their effects on the default betas in column (3). For instance, 
younger and lower-income consumers tend to have both lower scores and higher betas, and so 
might receive less credit for both reasons. Hence, consumers who are risky in terms of their 
default probability (the first moment p) also tend to have greater covariance risk (the second 
moment β). This could reflect the possibility that consumers who are near the edge of default 
(with large p) are very vulnerable to aggregate shocks, whereas those far from default might face 
more idiosyncratic shocks. As a result, the betas and the scores overall have a negative 
correlation (of about -.2 and significant), as is also evident in Table 1.
26  
In all columns in Table 2 the R
2 is relatively small, indicating that the individual and 
regional characteristics explain only a small fraction of the cross-sectional variation in the credit 
scores and estimated default betas. This could partly reflect measurement error in the 
demographic characteristics. The R
2 is much smaller for the betas however, which could reflect 
the imprecision in their estimation.
27 Nonetheless the individual and regional variables are jointly 
statistically very significant in explaining the betas in columns (1)-(4). We conclude that there is 
significant systematic heterogeneity across consumers in their default betas.  
Table 3 tests whether the differences in consumers’ default betas affect the amount of 
credit they actually receive. The four pairs of columns consider the total number of credit trades, 
the number of non-revolving and revolving trades, and total credit card limits for each consumer, 
respectively. Following eq. (3), to minimize endogeneity credit is measured as of 2000 
                                                            
26 Suppose consumer i's probability of default can be described as Pit =  δi + γiYt, where δi captures his average 
probability of default, and γi his sensitivity to an aggregate state variable Y such as the business cycle (consistent 
with heterogeneity in the default betas). These results are consistent with δi and γi being positively correlated.  23   
(Credit00), whereas the credit score is taken from 1999 and the default beta is computed over 
1997-1999. Table 3 begins with the total number of trades, AllTrades00. Column (1) includes as 
independent variables only the credit score and beta. The score has a large, positive effect on the 
number of trades. This effect is highly significant, with a t-ratio above 100. Cross-sectionally, 
increasing the score by one standard deviation (about 0.9) increases the number of trades on 
average by about 2 (≈ .9*2.095), c.p. Since the average number of trades is under 7, this effect is 
also economically quite significant. As expected, credit scores play an important role in the 
allocation of credit. The coefficient on the default beta is also significant, with a negative sign. 
Consumers with greater covariance risk do in fact obtain less credit, even controlling for their 
expected probability of default. Cross-sectionally, a one standard deviation increase in beta 
(about 2.5 in this sample) reduces the total number of trades by about 0.22.  While this effect is 
much smaller than that due to the score, it is nonetheless statistically significant.  
Column (2) adds the individual-level demographic characteristics and state dummies (not 
shown). The individual and state variables are each jointly significant, though less so than the 
credit score. Ceteris paribus, the number of trades increases with income, and exhibits an 
inverted-U shape life-cycle profile in age, peaking in the 50s. These effects are large in 
magnitude, with high-income and middle-aged (50-59) consumers having about 1.3 more trades 
on average than low-income and young consumers. The number of trades is also larger for 
consumers who are married and have larger households. Homeowners and business-owners also 
hold significantly more trades.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 Tables 3 and 4 below will control for the same demographic characteristics as in Table 2. Hence the significance 
of beta in Tables 3 and 4 implies that the variation in beta unexplained in Table 2 cannot reflect only measurement 
error. 24   
Adding the demographic characteristics and state dummies increases the R
2 somewhat 
relative to column (1), but as already explained this does not imply that lenders directly condition 
on these variables. Moreover these variables can of course also capture differences across 
consumers in the demand for credit, not just in the supply of credit. Nonetheless, controlling for 
the individual and state variables has little effect on the coefficients for beta and the score. 
Columns (3) and (4) show analogous results for only non-revolving trades. The pattern of 
coefficients is qualitatively similar to that for all trades, except for gender and an earlier peak in 
the effect of age. Beta again has a significant negative effect.  
Columns (5) and (6) instead isolate only revolving trades. The results are quantitatively 
similar to those in the first two columns for all trades. This is not surprising since the majority of 
total trades are revolving. The coefficient on beta for revolving trades (column (5)) is almost four 
times that for non-revolving trades (column (3)), a somewhat larger effect than the ratio of 
revolving to non-revolving trades. Moreover, the R
2 for revolving trades is much larger. While 
the demographic controls provide relatively less incremental explanatory power for revolving 
trades (columns (6) relative to (5) versus columns (4) relative to (3)), the default betas and 
especially the credit scores are relatively more significant in explaining revolving trades 
(columns (5) versus (3)).  
Columns (7) and (8) instead consider total credit card limits. In column (7) the credit 
score has a significant and large, positive effect on credit. Cross-sectionally, increasing the score 
by one standard deviation increases average credit limits by about $13 thousand. The default beta 
again has a significant negative effect. A one standard deviation increase in beta reduces credit 
limits by almost $900, a substantial amount. Column (8) adds the individual characteristics and 
state dummies, which again are each jointly significant. The pattern of signs on the coefficients is 25   
qualitatively similar to that in column (2). The demographic effects are often large in magnitude. 
The credit limits of high-income and middle-aged consumers are $8-12 thousand larger on 
average than those of low-income and young consumers, c.p. Homeowners and business owners 
also have relatively large credit limits.  
Overall, the results of Table 3 suggest that lenders put some weight, at least implicitly, on 
covariance risk in their decisions about credit allocation, though much less weight than on the 
credit scores. Moreover, given the negative correlation between the score and the default beta 
(and the imprecision in estimating the beta), by regulating the score lenders also indirectly 
regulate their covariance risk at the same time. To illustrate the potential effect of the correlation 
between the two measures of risk, one can re-estimate eq. (3) without the credit score. This 
significantly increases the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on beta, by almost half for 
non-revolving debt in column (3) and by about three times for revolving debt in columns (5) and 
(7).  
Table 4 instead investigates the relation between credit and beta in differences, following 
eq. (4). In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the change between 1999-2000 in the 
number of total trades, d(All Trades)00. To control for factors motivating the change in credit, 
we control for the change in the consumer’s credit score over the previous period 
(d(Creditscore)99), and focus on the interaction of beta with the change in score 
(d(Score)99*Beta99). For a given increase in the score, we test whether the resulting increase in 
credit is smaller for consumers with a larger default beta.   
The dependent variables include the lagged, starting number of trades in 1999 (Credit99), 
as well as an indicator (Credit99_zero) that equals one if the number of trades in 1999 starts at 
zero. In column (1), the lagged number of trades has a significant negative coefficient. Thus the 26   
increase in credit is smaller for consumers starting with a greater amount of credit, suggesting 
some mean reversion in the reported amount of credit across consumers. On the other hand, the 
indicator for zero credit also has a significant negative coefficient, consistent with a potential 
discontinuity at zero: Consumers starting with no credit receive relatively less credit going 
forward.  
The coefficient on the change in the credit score is significantly positive, with a large t-
ratio of about 40. To interpret its effect, consider a consumer with a beta of zero. If her score 
increases by .6 (the cross-sectional standard deviation in d(Creditscore)), over the next year this 
would boost her number of trades by, on average, (0.6)(0.628) ≈ .38, c.p. Even when estimated in 
differences using only within-consumer variation, the score continues to have a substantial effect 
on the amount of credit, even within a short period of 12 months. Nonetheless the coefficient on 
the default beta is significantly negative, implying that consumers with greater covariance risk on 
average experience smaller increases in credit over time. Notably, the interaction of beta with the 
change in score has a significant negative effect. For a given increase in the score, consumers 
with higher covariance risk do in fact receive a smaller increase in credit. Consider for 
comparison a second consumer, same as the first except that his beta is not zero but 2.5, one 
standard deviation higher.  Even with no change in his credit score, the growth in his number of 
trades would be lower on average by (2.5)(0.019) ≈ 0.048, c.p. If his score increases by .6, this 
would have the additional effect of boosting his number of trades by, on average, .38-
(0.6)(2.5)(0.029) ≈ 0.333, c.p. So overall after a .6 increase in score, the second consumer would 
experience over the next year a net increase in trades of 0.333-0.048 ≈ 0.29, which is about 25% 
less than the first consumer facing the same increase in score. 27   
Column (2) adds the individual demographic characteristics and state dummies, which are 
again each jointly significant. For instance, the change in the number of trades between 1999 and 
2000 is on average greater for higher-income consumers, but smaller for older consumers. 
Nonetheless the coefficients on both beta and the interaction of beta with the change in score 
remain significant and negative. Moreover, the R
2 starts large at .31 in column (1) and increases 
very little in column (2). Hence, after differencing out fixed effects in the level of credit, much 
more of the variation in the change in credit is accounted for by the covariates in column (1), 
especially the change in score and its interaction with beta, than by the demographic controls. 
In columns (3) and (4), for non-revolving trades, while the effects of beta and its 
interaction term remain negative in sign, the interaction term is less statistically significant, 
especially in column (4). By contrast, in columns (5) and (6) for revolving trades, both beta and 
its interaction term are significantly negative. The patterns of the other coefficients in columns 
(3)-(6) are generally qualitatively similar to those in columns (1) and (2). 
In column (7) for total bankcard limits, beta and the interaction term again have 
significant negative effects.  For a consumer with zero beta, if her score increases by .6, over the 
next year her credit limits would increase on average by about $1000, c.p. For an otherwise 
similar consumer with a one standard deviation larger beta, the resulting increase in limits, 
including both the interacted and uninteracted effect of beta, would be only about $200, 
substantially smaller. In column (8) the pattern of demographic coefficients is generally 
qualitatively similar to that in column (2), with the exception that the effect of age is positive.  
Overall, the results of Table 4 imply that consumers with greater covariance risk obtain 
significantly less credit over time. Covariance risk appears to be particularly important for 28   
revolving credit. This could reflect the fact that providers of revolving credit have available a rich 
prior performance history for their borrowers. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
This paper takes a portfolio view of consumer credit. It uses a unique credit bureau 
dataset to estimate the covariance risk of individual consumers and to analyze its underlying 
demographic determinants, as well as more generally the determinants of the cross-sectional 
distribution of credit, including the credit scores.  
We obtain two key sets of results. First, there is significant systematic heterogeneity 
across consumers in covariance risk. Covariance risk tends to be higher for younger and single 
consumers, lower-income consumers, those who rent rather than own, and those from states with 
higher rates of divorce and lower rates of health-insurance coverage. Consumers with high 
covariance risk also tend to have low credit scores (high default probabilities).  Second, the 
amount of credit obtained by consumers significantly increases with their credit scores, and, 
especially for revolving credit, significantly decreases with their covariance risk. This conclusion 
holds both in levels (in the cross-section) and in differences (for given consumers over time). It 
appears that some lenders assess borrowers’ covariance risk, at least implicitly, and put some 
weight on it in determining the amount of credit they provide. Nonetheless the effect of 
covariance risk on credit is much smaller in magnitude than that of the credit scores, suggesting 
the possibility that lenders might benefit from more systematic and quantitative consideration of 
covariance risk. 29   
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Notes: The vertical axis records the standard deviation of 'long-run returns' r*,long, cross-sectionally across 
100 portfolios of the size indicated on the horizontal axis (averaged over 10 replications). The random 
portfolio adds consumers randomly in building the portfolios, the geo-undiversified portfolio successively 
adds the consumers in the sample with the next closest zip code. For clarity, the horizontal axis shows 
portfolios of size 10 and above.    
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics      
              
     Creditscore99 
   Mean  S.D.  Low High 
         
AllTrades00   6.66 5.32  4.59  8.79 
Nonrevolving00   1.77 1.80  1.55  1.99 
Revolving00   4.89 4.53  3.05  6.80 
CardLimits00 ($1000)   18.65 32.97  5.53  32.19 
AllTrades00 >0   0.92 0.28  0.85  0.99 
Nonrevolving00 >0   0.73 0.44  0.66  0.80 
Revolving00 >0   0.85 0.36  0.73  0.98 
CardLimits00 >0   0.75 0.43  0.59  0.92 
Creditscore99   6.45 0.92  5.66  7.25 
Beta99   1.00 2.96  1.50  0.49 
    Income25-50   0.55 0.50  0.59  0.51 
   Income50+   0.30 0.46  0.23  0.36 
        IncomeMis   0.01 0.09  0.01  0.01 
      Age30_39   0.19 0.39  0.20  0.18 
      Age40_49   0.19 0.39  0.18  0.20 
      Age50_59   0.13 0.34  0.11  0.16 
      Age60_69   0.06 0.24  0.04  0.08 
      Age70+   0.04 0.21  0.03  0.06 
       AgeMis   0.10 0.30  0.10  0.09 
      Married   0.31 0.46  0.25  0.37 
        MarriedMis   0.13 0.34  0.13  0.14 
    SexMale   0.50 0.50  0.49  0.51 
SexMis   0.25 0.43  0.22  0.27 
       Kids2   0.05 0.22  0.04  0.06 
    Kids3+   0.03 0.16  0.02  0.03 
    KidsMis   0.61 0.49  0.59  0.64 
Adults2   0.24 0.43  0.22  0.26 
Adults3+   0.35 0.48  0.31  0.40 
Homeown   0.40 0.49  0.31  0.49 
HomeownMaybe   0.16 0.37  0.16  0.17 
HomeownMis   0.21 0.41  0.26  0.16 
Busown   0.011 0.11  0.009  0.014 
DemographicsMis   0.20 0.40  0.25  0.16 
Unemployment   5.10 1.01  5.14  5.05 
Noinsure   16.74 4.49  17.13  16.34 
Divorce   0.40 0.19  0.41  0.39 
    DivorceMis   0.12 0.33  0.12  0.13 
 
Notes: The sample corresponds to that in Table 2. (N = 87,013, but sample size for individual variables 
may vary with missing values.) The omitted demographic categories are low income (below $25 
thousand), young (below 30), unmarried, female, one child, one adult, renter, and not a business owner. 
‘DemographicsMis’ is a dummy variable indicating that most demographic variables are missing. 
Additional missing or unknown demographic values are labeled with the suffix ‘Mis’. ‘KidsMis’ reflects both 
missing values and 0 children. HomeownMaybe is predicted homeownership. State divorce rate is in per    
capita terms. Creditscore is the FICO credit bureau score/100. Credit limits are in $1000s. AllTrades00 >0 
is an indicator for having a positive numbers of trades, etc. Columns (3) and (4) split the sample at the 
average credit score of 6.45.    
Table 2: Heterogeneity in the Default Beta        
                                      






Individual and Regional 
Demographics 
Individual Demographics 
w/ State Dummies 
                                      
  coef  s.e. p-val  coef s.e. p-val coef s.e. p-val  coef s.e. p-val 
    Income25-50   -0.084 0.030 0.005        -0.086 0.033 0.011 -0.078 0.030 0.010 
   Income50+   -0.235 0.033 0.000        -0.227 0.039 0.000 -0.247 0.034 0.000 
        IncomeMis   -0.318 0.113 0.005        -0.131 0.126 0.304 -0.201 0.116 0.082 
      Age30_39   -0.123 0.043 0.004        -0.130 0.044 0.005 -0.125 0.043 0.003 
      Age40_49   -0.165 0.043 0.000        -0.167 0.040 0.000 -0.168 0.043 0.000 
      Age50_59   -0.189 0.046 0.000        -0.192 0.044 0.000 -0.190 0.046 0.000 
      Age60_69   -0.422 0.054 0.000        -0.437 0.046 0.000 -0.429 0.054 0.000 
      Age70+  -0.558 0.060 0.000        -0.562 0.060 0.000 -0.569 0.060 0.000 
       AgeMis   -0.185 0.048 0.000        -0.190 0.052 0.001 -0.197 0.048 0.000 
      Married   -0.137 0.033 0.000        -0.129 0.030 0.000 -0.124 0.033 0.000 
        MarriedMis   -0.017 0.040 0.681        -0.018 0.032 0.584 -0.018 0.040 0.650 
    SexMale   0.062 0.027  0.021        0.065 0.034 0.058 0.062 0.027 0.019 
SexMis   0.020 0.034  0.552        0.025 0.043 0.554 0.020 0.034 0.551 
       Kids2   -0.114 0.055 0.037        -0.105 0.039 0.010 -0.107 0.055 0.051 
    Kids3+   -0.070 0.069 0.314        -0.057 0.081 0.484 -0.064 0.069 0.355 
    KidsMis   -0.021 0.035 0.534        -0.025 0.033 0.464 -0.020 0.035 0.570 
Adults2   0.013 0.037  0.726        0.001 0.037 0.978 0.004 0.037 0.909 
Adults3+  0.033 0.039  0.390        0.022 0.032 0.504 0.019 0.039 0.623 
Homeown   -0.203 0.070 0.004        -0.210 0.102 0.045 -0.190 0.071 0.007 
HomeownMaybe   -0.069 0.072 0.343        -0.074 0.111 0.505 -0.050 0.073 0.490 
HomeownMis   0.063 0.072  0.381        0.049 0.114 0.669 0.076 0.072 0.294 
Busown   -0.004 0.095 0.970        -0.020 0.084 0.817 -0.019 0.095 0.839 
DemographicsMis   -0.088 0.087 0.315        -0.100 0.112 0.374 -0.089 0.088 0.309 
Unemployment           0.022  0.019  0.257  0.024  0.019  0.222         
Noinsure          0.015  0.004  0.001  0.013  0.004  0.002         
Divorce           0.358  0.109  0.002  0.255  0.137  0.069         
    DivorceMis           0.239  0.069  0.001  0.197  0.078  0.015         
       cons   1.379  0.088  0.000  0.468  0.123  0.000  0.935  0.170  0.000           
                             
(Adj.) R-squared     0.0059       0.0011       0.0069       0.0082   
Obs.     87,013        85,961        85,961        87,013       
 
Table 2: Heterogeneity in the Default Beta (ctd) 
           




           
 coef  s.e.  p-val 
    Income25-50   0.127 0.016  0.000 
   Income50+   0.340 0.021  0.000 
        IncomeMis   0.293 0.048  0.000 
      Age30_39   0.121 0.012  0.000 
      Age40_49   0.194 0.014  0.000 
      Age50_59   0.357 0.021  0.000 
      Age60_69   0.573 0.020  0.000 
      Age70+  0.726 0.030  0.000 
       AgeMis   0.233 0.017  0.000 
      Married   0.110 0.008  0.000 
        MarriedMis   0.007 0.008  0.440 
    SexMale   -0.016 0.013 0.224 
SexMis   0.015 0.007  0.041 
       Kids2   0.060 0.019  0.002 
    Kids3+   0.061 0.027  0.026 
    KidsMis   0.028 0.013  0.034 
Adults2   0.012 0.012  0.344 
Adults3+  -0.036 0.008 0.000 
Homeown   0.230 0.021  0.000 
HomeownMaybe   0.125 0.022  0.000 
HomeownMis   -0.085 0.024 0.001 
Busown   -0.030 0.027 0.268 
DemographicsMis   0.154 0.031  0.000 
Unemployment   -0.004 0.012 0.701 
Noinsure  -0.015 0.002 0.000 
Divorce   -0.067 0.112 0.550 
    DivorceMis   -0.083 0.066 0.218 
       cons   6.223 0.071  0.000 
        
(Adj.) R-squared    0.1058   
Obs.     85,961    
    
Notes: See eq. (2). In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variable is the Default Beta, computed over 1997:04-1999:03. In column (5), it is the Creditscore, from 
1999:03. See Table 1 for description of the independent variables. Regional demographics are taken from 1997 (3/1997 for unemployment). Column (4) includes 
state dummies (not shown). Columns (2), (3) and (5), with state demographics, adjust the standard errors for within-state correlation and report the unadjusted R-
squared.    
 
Table 3: The Amount of Credit and the Default Beta -- Levels      
                                         
  All Trades00    Nonrevolving Trades00 
Credit00 
(1)  (2) 
w/  demographic controls    
(3)  (4) 
w/  demographic controls 
                    
   coef s.e.  p-val  coef s.e.  p-val    coef s.e. p-val  coef s.e. p-val 
Creditscore99  2.095 0.019  0.000 1.859 0.019  0.000    0.152 0.007 0.000 0.110 0.007 0.000 
Beta99  -0.087 0.007 0.000 -0.083 0.007 0.000    -0.019 0.002 0.000 -0.017 0.002 0.000 
    Income25-50           0.550 0.050  0.000             0.136  0.018  0.000 
   Income50+           1.354 0.056  0.000          0.353  0.020  0.000 
        IncomeMis           0.867 0.189  0.000          0.077  0.068  0.259 
      Age30_39           0.466 0.070  0.000          0.072  0.025  0.005 
      Age40_49           1.034 0.070  0.000          0.074  0.025  0.004 
      Age50_59           1.338 0.075  0.000          -0.007  0.027  0.789 
      Age60_69           0.398 0.090  0.000          -0.436  0.033  0.000 
      Age70+          -1.000 0.099 0.000          -0.868  0.036  0.000 
       AgeMis           0.708 0.079  0.000          0.158  0.029  0.000 
      Married           0.247 0.054  0.000          0.093  0.020  0.000 
        MarriedMis           -0.078 0.066 0.235          -0.065  0.024  0.006 
    SexMale           -0.415 0.044 0.000          0.245  0.016  0.000 
SexMis           0.005 0.056  0.924          -0.050  0.020  0.014 
       Kids2           0.350 0.089  0.000          0.065  0.032  0.045 
    Kids3+           0.265 0.113  0.019          -0.028  0.041  0.485 
    KidsMis           -0.198 0.057 0.000          -0.073  0.020  0.000 
Adults2           0.115 0.061  0.061          0.067  0.022  0.003 
Adults3+          0.203 0.064  0.001          0.070  0.023  0.002 
Homeown           1.424 0.116  0.000          0.911  0.042  0.000 
HomeownMaybe           0.290 0.119  0.015          0.386  0.043  0.000 
HomeownMis           0.015 0.118  0.897          0.314  0.043  0.000 
Busown           1.106 0.156  0.000          0.307  0.057  0.000 
DemographicsMis           0.340 0.144  0.018          0.314  0.052  0.000 
       cons   -7.073 0.122 0.000             0.808 0.045 0.000           
                              
Adj.  R-squared     0.136     0.189       0.007    0.073  
Obs.     85,903        85,903           85,903        85,903    
    
 
Table 3: The Amount of Credit and the Default Beta -- Levels  (ctd)           
                                         
  Revolving Trades00    Credit Card Limits00 
Credit00 
(5)  (6) 
w/  demographic controls    
(7)  (8) 
w/  demographic controls 
                      
   coef s.e.  p-val  coef s.e. p-val    coef s.e. p-val  coef s.e. p-val 
Creditscore99  1.943 0.016  0.000  1.749 0.016 0.000    14.277 0.116  0.000 12.509 0.119  0.000 
Beta99  -0.069 0.006 0.000  -0.066 0.006  0.000    -0.349 0.042 0.000 -0.329 0.041 0.000 
    Income25-50            0.415  0.042  0.000          2.013  0.307  0.000 
   Income50+           1.002  0.047  0.000          8.174  0.346  0.000 
        IncomeMis           0.789  0.160  0.000          1.514  1.166  0.194 
      Age30_39           0.394  0.059  0.000          2.428  0.432  0.000 
      Age40_49           0.960  0.059  0.000          7.530  0.434  0.000 
      Age50_59           1.345  0.064  0.000          12.615  0.466  0.000 
      Age60_69           0.834  0.076  0.000          9.266  0.554  0.000 
      Age70+          -0.132  0.083  0.113          2.833  0.608  0.000 
       AgeMis           0.551  0.067  0.000          6.538  0.490  0.000 
      Married           0.153  0.046  0.001          1.506  0.334  0.000 
        MarriedMis           -0.013  0.056  0.816          -0.247  0.408  0.545 
    SexMale           -0.660  0.037  0.000          2.923  0.270  0.000 
SexMis           0.055  0.047  0.241          0.901  0.343  0.009 
       Kids2           0.285  0.075  0.000          0.824  0.550  0.134 
    Kids3+           0.293  0.095  0.002          1.611  0.695  0.020 
    KidsMis           -0.126  0.048  0.009          -0.887  0.349  0.011 
Adults2           0.048  0.052  0.354          -0.152  0.377  0.686 
Adults3+          0.133  0.054  0.013          0.878  0.393  0.025 
Homeown           0.513  0.098  0.000          4.731  0.715  0.000 
HomeownMaybe           -0.095  0.101  0.345          1.900  0.736  0.010 
HomeownMis           -0.299  0.100  0.003          0.191  0.729  0.794 
Busown           0.798  0.132  0.000          7.269  0.963  0.000 
DemographicsMis           0.026  0.121  0.832          5.423  0.887  0.000 
       cons   -7.567 0.104 0.000             -73.06  0.762  0.000          
                       
Adj.  R-squared   0.159     0.203    0.159    0.201  
Obs.     85,903        85,903           85,903        85,903    
 
Notes: See eq. (3). The dependent variable, Credit00, is from 2000:03. The Creditscore is from 1999:03, and Beta is computed over 1997:04 - 
1999:03. Demographic controls include state dummies.    
 
Table 4: The Amount of Credit and the Default Beta -- Changes 
                                         
  d(All Trades)00    d(Nonrevolving Trades)00 
dCredit00 
(1) (2) 
w/  demographic 
 controls    
(3) (4) 
w/  demographic 
controls 
                     
   coef s.e.  p-val  coef s.e. p-val    coef  s.e. p-val coef  s.e. p-val 
Credit99  -0.253 0.001 0.000 -0.258 0.001  0.000    -0.280 0.003 0.000 -0.292 0.003 0.000 
Credit99_zero  -0.285 0.039 0.000 -0.224 0.038  0.000    -0.081 0.012 0.000 -0.043 0.012 0.000 
d(Creditscore)99  0.628 0.016  0.000 0.627 0.016  0.000   0.119  0.008 0.000 0.113  0.008 0.000 
Beta99  -0.019 0.003 0.000 -0.017 0.003  0.000    -0.004 0.002 0.008 -0.004 0.002 0.021 
d(Score)99*Beta99  -0.029 0.005 0.000 -0.027 0.005  0.000    -0.005 0.002 0.057 -0.004 0.002 0.105 
    Income25-50           0.152  0.026  0.000           0.051  0.012  0.000 
   Income50+           0.181  0.029  0.000           0.122  0.014  0.000 
        IncomeMis           0.089  0.097  0.361           -0.034  0.047  0.473 
      Age30_39           -0.093  0.036  0.010           -0.058  0.017  0.001 
      Age40_49           -0.039  0.036  0.282           -0.065  0.017  0.000 
      Age50_59           -0.030  0.039  0.435           -0.109  0.019  0.000 
      Age60_69           -0.215  0.046  0.000           -0.259  0.022  0.000 
      Age70+          -0.583  0.050  0.000           -0.383  0.024  0.000 
       AgeMis           0.019  0.041  0.646           0.001  0.020  0.941 
      Married           0.012  0.028  0.670           0.022  0.013  0.105 
        MarriedMis           -0.093  0.034  0.006           -0.036  0.016  0.030 
    SexMale           0.220  0.022  0.000           0.075  0.011  0.000 
SexMis           0.123  0.029  0.000           0.009  0.014  0.511 
       Kids2           0.061  0.046  0.182           -0.004  0.022  0.854 
    Kids3+           0.001  0.058  0.986           0.003  0.028  0.928 
    KidsMis           -0.006  0.029  0.842           -0.035  0.014  0.012 
Adults2           0.093  0.031  0.003           0.027  0.015  0.079 
Adults3+          0.106  0.033  0.001           0.022  0.016  0.168 
Homeown           0.175  0.060  0.003           0.248  0.029  0.000 
HomeownMaybe           0.086  0.061  0.162           0.122  0.030  0.000 
HomeownMis           0.068  0.061  0.265           0.093  0.029  0.002 
Busown           0.104  0.080  0.193           0.112  0.039  0.004 
DemographicsMis           -0.190  0.074  0.010           -0.008  0.036  0.821 
       cons   0.693  0.016  0.000             0.426  0.008  0.000          
Adj.  R-squared     0.305     0.315       0.153     0.165  
Obs.     85,704        85,704           85,704        85,704       
Table 4: The Amount of Credit and the Default Beta -- Changes (ctd)     
                                         
  d(Revolving Trades)00    d(Credit Card Limits)00 
dCredit00 
(5) (6) 
w/  demographic 
controls    
(7)  (8) 
w/  demographic controls 
 
                      
   coef s.e.  p-val  coef s.e.  p-val    coef s.e.  p-val  coef s.e. p-val 
Credit99  -0.264 0.001 0.000 -0.266 0.001 0.000    -0.092 0.002 0.000 -0.102 0.002  0.000 
Credit99_zero  -0.062 0.024 0.010 -0.015 0.024 0.527    -3.506 0.140 0.000 -2.917 0.142  0.000 
d(Creditscore)99  0.491 0.013  0.000 0.494 0.013  0.000    1.719 0.106  0.000 1.714 0.105 0.000 
Beta99  -0.019 0.003 0.000 -0.017 0.003 0.000    -0.228 0.023 0.000 -0.213 0.023  0.000 
d(Score)99*Beta99  -0.026 0.004 0.000 -0.025 0.004 0.000    -0.170 0.033 0.000 -0.152 0.033  0.000 
    Income25-50           0.114  0.021  0.000           0.759  0.172  0.000 
   Income50+           0.094  0.024  0.000           1.945  0.194  0.000 
        IncomeMis           0.152  0.080  0.057           0.754  0.653  0.248 
      Age30_39           -0.018  0.030  0.544           0.455  0.242  0.060 
      Age40_49           0.053  0.030  0.076           1.190  0.243  0.000 
      Age50_59           0.114  0.032  0.000           1.863  0.262  0.000 
      Age60_69           0.069  0.038  0.068           1.891  0.309  0.000 
      Age70+          -0.190  0.041  0.000           0.496  0.338  0.142 
       AgeMis           0.041  0.033  0.217           1.364  0.274  0.000 
      Married           -0.001  0.023  0.973           0.312  0.187  0.096 
        MarriedMis           -0.057  0.028  0.041           -0.369  0.228  0.106 
    SexMale           0.141  0.018  0.000           0.626  0.151  0.000 
SexMis           0.109  0.023  0.000           0.286  0.192  0.136 
       Kids2           0.072  0.038  0.054           0.742  0.307  0.016 
    Kids3+           0.002  0.047  0.959           0.844  0.389  0.030 
    KidsMis           0.026  0.024  0.271           -0.240  0.195  0.218 
Adults2           0.069  0.026  0.008           0.186  0.211  0.378 
Adults3+          0.086  0.027  0.001           0.309  0.220  0.160 
Homeown           -0.026  0.049  0.599           1.163  0.401  0.004 
HomeownMaybe           -0.018  0.050  0.727           0.721  0.412  0.080 
HomeownMis           -0.021  0.050  0.674           -0.391  0.409  0.339 
Busown           0.010  0.066  0.881           -0.396  0.539  0.463 
DemographicsMis           -0.159  0.061  0.009           0.344  0.497  0.489 
       cons   0.400 0.013  0.000             4.461 0.081  0.000          
                       
Adj.  R-squared   0.349     0.358       0.031     0.039  
Obs.     85,704        85,704           85,704        85,704       
Notes: See eq. (4). The dependent variable, dCredit00, measures the change in credit over 1999:03-2000:03. The initial amount of credit Credit99 is 
from 1999:03, and Credit99_zero is a dummy variable indicating no credit in 1999:03. The Creditscore is from 1999:03, and the Default Beta is 
computed over 1997:04 - 1999:03. Demographic controls include state dummies. 
 